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EU REGULATION OF NEW PLANT BREEDING
TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR POSSIBLE ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE EU AND BEYOND




New plant breeding technologies (NPBTs), including CRISPR gene editing,
are being usedwidely, and they are driving the development of new crops. They
are nevertheless a subject of criticism and discussion. According to a summer
2018 interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Eu-
ropean Union (EU) law makes most NPBTS subject to regulations governing
the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the EU. The implications
of this decision have been widely discussed in the literature, thereby stress-
ing the importance of the decision for plant breeding and international trade
within and beyond the EU.
This contribution summarizes the status of the debate and highlights issues
that have thus far not been considered—particularly with regard to the impli-
cations of EU regulations for NPBTs for countries outside the EU.
We conclude that the practical implications of theCJEUdecision reduce the
EU’s comparative advantage and increase the cost of achieving the objectives
of the European Green Deal. Our findings reveal an almost complete lack of
possibilities for changing the current situation. China and countries oriented
towards China are the most likely economic beneficiaries of the current situa-
tion.
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I I n troduct ion
New plant breeding technologies (NPBTs) include a range of technologies
aimed at helping plant breeders to develop crops with desired traits more pre-
cisely and much more rapidly than would be possible with technologies based
on chemical or radiation-induced mutations. In many cases, the new tech-
nologies induce only very precise desired point mutations, while other breed-
ing tools (e.g., mutations induced by chemicals or radiation) are less precise,
altering much larger parts of a plant’s genome. Although the use of NPBTs
cannot eliminate off-target effects (i.e., changes to other parts of a plant’s
genome), it does make such effects less common. In addition, the potential
off-target effects of NPBTs are better understood than are those of other plant-
breeding technologies, particularly with regard to techniques involving the ap-
plication of chemical and radiation-induced mutations. For this reason, many
scientists consider NPBTs safer than many of the alternative tools (Nationale
Akademie derWissenschaften Leopoldina, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
undUnion der deutschen Akademien derWissenschaften. 2019). Despite con-
siderable consensus among experts in the areas ofmolecular biology and plant-
breeding with respect to the safety of the technologies, many policymakers and
lobby groups are less convinced. In this contribution, we apply the language
and syntax of EuropeanUnion (EU) legislation—especially the definitions stip-
ulated therein, as well as in those documents used by the Court. In addition,
we summarize as NPBTs those discussed by Sprink et al. (2017).
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The diverse views on safety and related regulatory policies have led to
considerable controversy, particularly within the EU. Experts in the areas of
molecular biology and plant breeding call for regulating plants derived from
NPBTs, depending on the method applied, in a manner similar to the regu-
lation of plants derived from chemical and radiation-induced mutations. In
contrast, many others view almost all plants derived from NPBTs as geneti-
cally modified organisms (GMOs), thus claiming that they are regulated as
such (Sprink et al. 2017). In the longer term, many argue the need for revising
the GMO regulations to reflect an approach based more on products than on
processes (Eriksson et al. 2019; Purnhagen et al. 2018b; Seitz, 2018; Wanner et
al. 2019).
Most scholars agree that the current legal status in the EU is that plants
produced by NPBTs fall under the regulations for GMOs. This has wide-
ranging implications for plant breeding within and beyond the EU. The impli-
cations are much broader than has previously been discussed in the literature,
which has tended to overlook a number of links between EU-level regulations
and their implications for investments in plant breeding and trade in agricul-
tural products.
In this contribution, we summarize the regulations that apply to GMOs
in the EU, along with the case decided by the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU). Based on this summary, we discuss the implications of the reg-
ulations and their interpretation for plant breeding within and beyond the EU,
particularly with regard to international trade. We further consider these im-
plications in terms of possibilities for changing the situation within the EU. As
we note, however, such possibilities are limited, and those that are available are
likely to be time-consuming.
Overall, our analysis of the political and legal situation leads to the con-
clusion that the application of NPBTs to crops intended for the European mar-
ket and for countries that produce for the European market are extremely lim-
ited. First, this reduces the comparative advantage for the agricultural sector
in the EU and the opportunities for the United States for exporting to the EU.
Second, this provides stronger incentives for countries to adopt NPBTs that
do not export substantial volumes of agricultural and food products to the EU
than otherwise.
I I The L egal S i tuat i on in the European Un ion
A Regulation of GMOs in the European Union
In the broadest terms, the approval of GMOs in the EU follows a two-step risk-
analysis procedure. In this section, we summarize the basic steps. The approval
process is discussed in greater detail by Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes (2019).
For a comparison between the approval processes of the EU and the United
States, see e.g. Smart, Blum, and Wesseler (2017).
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Risk assessment is the first step in the approval process. This assessment
is, as a matter of principle, conducted by the European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA). The second step consists of the risk management, which is performed
by the European Commission (EC) and EU Member States.
In Article 2 of Directive 2001/18 on the deliberate release of GMOs into
the environment (EC, 2001, hereinafter “Directive” or “Directive 2001/18”), the
EU defines a GMO as follows: “…an organism, with the exception of human
beings, in which the geneticmaterial has been altered in a way that does not oc-
cur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination.” As specified in Article
3, theDirective does not apply to techniques listed inAnnex I B of theDirective.
Without further specification, these exemptions include mutagenesis, which is
conventionally understood in non-legal terms as the process of altering the ge-
netic information of an organism either spontaneously or deliberately (e.g., by
using chemicals, radiation, or NPBTs).
Directive 2001/18 is relevant to the approval of GMOs for deliberative
release into the environment (i.e., “cultivation”) or for placement on the mar-
ket within the EU. The Directive does not directly apply to approvals for the
import and processing of genetically modified food and feed, which are cov-
ered under Regulation 1829/2003 (EC, 2003a) on genetically modified food
and feed (hereinafter “Regulation” or “Regulation 1829/2003”). This Regula-
tion defines genetically modified food and feed as “containing, consisting of
or produced from GMOs” (Article 2, Regulation 1829/2003), with GMOs un-
derstood as defined in Directive 2001/18. All food and feed covered under Reg-
ulation 1829/2003 are further subject to requirements concerning labeling and
traceability. These requirements are further detailed in Regulation 1830/2003
on the labeling and traceability of GM food and feed (EC, 2003b). Labeling
exemptions apply to the adventitious or technically unavoidable presence of
traces of GMOs, as long as they do not exceed the threshold level of 0.9%, as
defined under Regulation 1829/2003. This threshold applies to the labeling of
GMOs that have been authorized for import and processing. For GMOs that
have not been approved but that have received a positive risk assessment by
the EFSA, a threshold level of 0% applies for food, with a threshold of 0.1% for
feed (EC 2011). Regulation 1830/2003 also states that GMOs require unique
identifiers prior to authorization.
B GMO Risk Analysis in the EU
Applications for the approval of GMOs for cultivation and/or import and pro-
cessing must be submitted to the competent authority in one of the Mem-
ber States, which assesses the application and submits it to EFSA. The EFSA
then assesses the application and presents a recommendation to the EC, which
sends a proposal, based on the recommendation by the EFSA, to the relevant
EC Standing Committee, which includes representatives of all EU Member
States. The Committee members discuss the EC proposal and arrive at a deci-
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sion by qualifiedmajority voting (see Box 1). If no qualifiedmajority is reached
in favor or against the proposal, the EC may revise the proposal and resub-
mit it to the Committee, or it may submit the original proposal to the Appeal
Committee. The Appeal Committee also includes representatives from all EU
Member States and decides by qualified majority voting. If it fails to reach a
qualified majority in favor or against the EC’s proposal, the EC will make the
final decision (Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes 2019). Experience has shown
that, since 2001, neither the Standing Committee nor the Appeal Committee
has ever reached a qualified majority, and the EC has made the final decision
in all cases (Smart, Blum, and Wesseler 2015). Even if crops are approved, each
EU Member State has the possibility of opting out of approval for cultivation
with effect to their territory (EC, 2015).
If a new crop does not fall under the approval process for GMOs, this
does not imply that it is “unregulated,” as claimed by some authors. For exam-
ple, in cross-border cases, the new crop would still be subject to general EU
requirements (e.g., those applying to the free movement of goods and possibly
the General Food Law), and it would need to comply with the registration re-
quirements of EUMember States (Purnhagen et al, 2018b). Furthermore, such
new crops are not exempt from the various liability regimes for environmental
and food safety that apply at the level of the EU or that of its Member States
(Dries et al. 2019).
C The Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union
The widely discussed regulations on NPBTs originated with a court case in
France in 2015, where the cultivation of herbicide-tolerant crops developed by
non-GMO plant-breeding techniques (e.g., oilseed, rape, and sunflowers) has
increased in the past 20 years. Nine French agriculture and environmental as-
sociations had asked the French Prime Minister to impose a moratorium on
the sale and cultivation of herbicide-resistant oilseed rape and sunflower in
France in December 2014. They argued, if herbicide resistance had been in-
troduced by mutagenesis, those crops should be considered GMOs, but would
be exempted according to Annex I B of the Directive 2001/18. According to
their reasoning, if directed mutagenesis had been applied, cultivation should
be stopped until approval, as the exemption applied only to methods of muta-
genesis that had been in use before 2001. The Prime Minister did not respond
to the request—under French law, this is regarded as a rejection of the request.
On March 12, 2015, therefore, the associations submitted an application to the
Conseil d’État (Council of State, France) to ask the Prime Minister to impose
the moratorium (Liberation, 2015). On October 3, 2016, the Conseil d’État re-
ferred this case to the Court of Justice of the EuropeanUnion (CJEU) by asking
four specific questions, which can be summarized as follows (for additional de-
tails, see e.g., Bobek, 2018; Purnhagen, 2019; Seitz, 2018): are plants produced
by using mutagenesis to be considered GMOs, and are those produced by us-
6 CAMPUS KULMBACH LEGAL WORKING PAPERS [№ 1/20
ing directed mutagenesis exempted from Directive 2001/18, as they would also
be covered by the mutagenesis exemption in Annex I B of the Directive?
Not surprisingly (Purnhagen et al. 2018a), the CJEU (2018) decided
that plants developed bymutagenesis are regarded asGMOs, but that plants de-
veloped by directed mutagenesis do not fall under the mutagenesis exemption.
The latter decision came as a surprise, as the Opinion of the Advocate General
(Bobek 2018)—which the CJEU follows in a majority of the cases (Purnhagen
2018b)— had proposed a different kind of interpretation.
Many biologists and other scientists criticized the judgement, and par-
ticularly the CJEU’s argument that only “organisms obtained by means of tech-
niques/methods of mutagenesis which have conventionally been used in a num-
ber of applications and have a long safety record are excluded from the scope of
that directive” (CJEU 2018, para 54). They regard plants developed by directed
mutagenesis—which often results in point mutations only —as being at least
as safe as those developed by traditional methods of mutagenesis. Further-
more, they pointed to the long safety record of plants developed by transgenesis
(e.g., Eriksson et al. 2019; Group of Chief Scientific Advisors 2018; Nationale
Akademie derWissenschaften Leopoldina, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
und Union der deutschen Akademien der Wissenschaften 2019).
As a result of the judgment, plants developed by methods of directed
mutagenesis are regarded as GMOs, and they must therefore be approved for
cultivation. The judgment could also be interpreted as covering the placing
of food and feed on the EU market, including import and processing (Purn-
hagen, 2019), thus making them subject to requirements concerning labelling
and traceability along the supply chain (Eriksson et al. 2019).
D Application of the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle has been an important argument for placing tech-
niques of directed mutagenesis under the EU regulations for GMOs. In its
decision, the CJEU states, “It follows that an interpretation of the exemption
in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/18, read in conjunction with point 1 of Annex I
B thereto, which excludes organisms obtained by means of techniques/methods
of mutagenesis from the scope of that directive, without any distinctions, would
compromise the objective of protection pursued by the directive and would fail
to respect the precautionary principle which it seeks to implement.” As specified
in Article 4 of Directive 2001/18, “Member States shall, in accordance with the
precautionary principle, ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid
adverse effects on human health and the environment which might arise from
the deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs. GMOs may only be
deliberately released or placed on the market in conformity with part B or part C
respectively.” In line with its case law, the CJEU based its decision on a specific
understanding of the precautionary principle that is tailored to the risks legally
associated with GMOs. This understanding reflects the wording and spirit of
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the applicable EU regulations. As such, this understanding can be understood
as an absolute interpretation of the precautionary principle.
I I I Impl i cat i on s of the C JEU Jud gment
If the CJEU judgment is interpreted to cover food and feed, it has direct impli-
cations for investments in plant breeding. In general, a firm’s investments in
new technologies can be viewed as a portfolio of call options (Berk et al. 1999).
The value of a specific investment depends on the investments to be made, the
expected returns to be generated, and market risks related to the investment.
The value chain for plant breeding can be divided into four important phases:
R&D, approval, market, and ex-post liability. The R&D and approval phases
generate costs, while the market phase generates the benefits from investment.
The ex-post liability phase entails the potential costs of legal issues related to
the introduction of the product. The duration of each phase and the costs and
benefits associated with them are uncertain from an ex-ante perspective. Treat-
ing NPBTs as GMOs substantially increases the cost of approval, as it affects
both the time required for a new product to reach the market and the costs in-
volved in bringing it to the market. Moreover, differences in approval require-
ments across jurisdictions generate asynchronicity in market access, thereby
disrupting international trade.
The marginal effects of an increase in approval costs on the investment
hurdle have been estimated as amounting to a factor of between seven and
fourteen. In other words, one unit of additional costs requires between seven
and fourteen additional units of benefits. Similar results have been derived for
the marginal effects of changes in R&D costs (Purnhagen and Wesseler 2019).
Later in this article, the implications of the ruling are discussed in the light
of the framework discussed above by explicitly considering the legal environ-
ment.
A Implications for Plant Breeding in the European Union
The results of the CJEU judgment have a direct effect on the costs of applying
techniques of directed mutagenesis within the context of plant breeding. For
illustration, to date, only three agricultural crops—two corn events and one
potato event—have received approval for cultivation in the EU. Only one of
these crops is currently being cultivated on a commercial scale. Of the other
two crops, one has not been commercialized due to poor performance, and
the other has been withdrawn due to high public resistance and regulatory
problems. The two corn events received approval prior to the change in the
GMO regulation, while the potato event received approval after more than 15
years (Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes 2019).
Crops developed by NPBTs for cultivation in the EU must go through
the approval process for GMOs—a long, costly, and uncertain process. Fur-
8 CAMPUS KULMBACH LEGAL WORKING PAPERS [№ 1/20
ther, the opt-out possibility mentioned above may reduce the number of farm-
ers that can cultivate the plant. Depending on the trait in question, this could
reduce the potential market for the crops and overall incentives to invest in
the application of NPBTs for the EU market (Nationale Akademie der Wis-
senschaften Leopoldina, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft und Union der
deutschen Akademien der Wissenschaften 2019; Smyth and Lassoued 2019;
Wesseler, Politiek, and Zilberman 2019). The implications for plant breeders
in the EU are mixed, depending on their position in the market. The CJEU
judgment protects plant-breeding companies developing products only for the
European market from outside competition. At the same time, it increases the
likelihood that international plant breeders will relocate their research from
Europe to other places. Plant-breeding companies that do not develop crops
only for the EU market now have even stronger incentives to relocate their re-
search to other regions, like the Americas (Wesseler, Politiek, and Zilberman
2019) or China. The risks associated with importing food and feed into the EU
are likely to be distributed along the food and feed supply chain increasing the
price. As a consequence, new innovations in plant breeding might not reach
farmers in the EU or, if they do reach the EU, it will be at a substantial delay.
Seed and feed prices are also expected to increase. Overall this will reduce the
comparative advantage of European agriculture (e.g. Gocht et al. 2020).
The CJEU decision could potentially strengthen the development of or-
ganic agriculture in the EU, as it could potentially lead more farmers to move
into that sector after losing their comparative advantage in non-organic agri-
culture. The CJEU decision also comes at a cost, as it reduces the use of NPBTs
for the organic sector. Such developments will depend on the development
of the organic sector outside the EU. The possibility that NPBTs might be al-
lowed in organic agriculture outside the EU (e.g., in the United States) could
also cause the EU organic sector to lose its comparative advantages. Although
the overall effect is largely an empirical question, the negative implications of
such a situation for innovations in plant breeding and related environmental
and health benefits are obvious. Table 1 provides an overview of NPBT appli-
cations in plant breeding, as mentioned in the literature, as an illustration of
the expected benefits that might be foregone by an increase in approval costs
and smaller markets.
The implications of the CJEU judgment are also affecting the develop-
ment of the EU bioeconomy. Many technological developments that produce
high-value products depend on achieving improvements in biomass for pro-
cessing. This is now more difficult, given the expected increases in develop-
ment costs that are dependent on crop improvement through NPBTs. More-
over, many of the bioreactors that process biomass use genetically modified
bacteria-producing enzymes to increase the efficiency of the conversion pro-
cess (Wesseler and von Braun, 2017). Their approval is also to be expected by
the Courts ruling as further discussed below.
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B Challenges for Labeling and Identity Preservation
GMOs entering the market in the EU are required to be labeled. An overview
of the labeling requirements for GMOs in the EU is provided in Table 2. Fi-
nal products that are not intended as food or feed (e.g., biofuels) are likely not
to be affected by labeling and identify preservation requirements. Neverthe-
less, the labeling and identify preservation requirements induced by the CJEU
decision go beyond the traditional food and feed sector. The strategy of the
bioeconomy (Wesseler and von Braun 2017), however, is to produce products
that can be used as food and feed additives in order to increase value. Such
products would require approval in the EU, in addition to being subject to re-
quirements concerning labeling and tracking, particularly if they are derived
from genetically modified bacteria developed through directed mutagenesis.
The following example of a transgenic crop to produce a biolpolymer serves to
illustrate the implications of the CJEU judgment.
The EU-funded sustainable co-production project (https://www.cobi
otech.eu/funded-projects/sustainable-co-production) aims to extract and
process cyanophycin from transgenic tobacco. The tobacco will be grown in
Argentina, as cultivation in Europe is subject to a lengthy, costly, and uncer-
tain approval process. Cyanophycin is an amino acid polymer that can be used
as feed additive, for the coating of medical tablets, and for the development of
food-packaging material. The current legal interpretation is that the use of
cyanophycin as a feed additive and coating for medical tablets requires label-
ing for the European market. It is not yet clear whether the food-packaging
material would require labeling as well. The labeling requirements specify that
products have unique identifiers to allow the identification and tracing of the
cyanophycin (EC, 2003a).
TheCJEU judgment results in similar labeling requirements onNPBTs,
thereby posing difficulties for minor alterations, which could also result from
spontaneous mutations. This increases the difficulty to differentiate and is
likely to constitute a challenge in terms of labeling, traceability, and liability
for food business operators in the supply chain. The resulting products would
be similar to credence goods, for which identity preservation (IP) is arranged
through contracting along the supply chain, combined with a monitoring sys-
tem, as is common for food products labeled as organic or GM-free (Castel-
lari et al. 2018; Venus, Drabic, Wesseler 2018). These processes increase costs
(Bovay and Alston 2018; Kalaitzandonakes, Lusk, and Magnier 2018), however,
thus having further implications for international trade, as discussed in greater
detail below.
C Implications for International Trade
The practice resulting from the CJEU decision has substantial implications for
international trade. For example, the judgment would require GMOs devel-
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oped by NPBTs and cultivated in the United States, Canada, China, Brazil, Ar-
gentina, or other countries outside the EU to obtain approval for import into
the EU (see above). As mentioned before, the approval process would require
the submission of a unique identifier method, which is likely to be difficult
to develop. One solution might be to add a genetic marker gene or enzyme,
but this would result in additional changes in the genome. Other solutions
might include using a unique identification code that can be linked to a spe-
cific change in a plant. The potential precision of each of these approaches is
still to be tested in practice, however, as is the question of whether it would
satisfy the legal requirements for approval (Grohmann et al. 2019).
Plant breeders outside the EU do not necessarily have to apply for ap-
proval for import to the EU, particularly if the EU is not among the targeted
export markets. The problem is that, if a GMO has not been approved for
import into the EU, it will be subject to a threshold level of 0% for food or
0.1% for feed as discussed above. This opens up the possibility of an import
ban from countries cultivating plant developed by NPBTs (e.g., corn or soy-
beans), as has happened in the past. In practical terms, the current situation
imposes an implicit ban on the import of commodities derived from GMOs
and non-GMOs from countries where GMOs developed using NPBTs have
been approved and are cultivated. The implementation of a reliable system of
tracking and tracing will cause economic difficulties along the supply chain
and such systems are vulnerable to the threat of a potential import ban (Punt
and Wesseler 2016). Countries that export significant volumes and numbers
of agricultural and food commodities to the EU may consider whether to ap-
prove the cultivation of GMOs derived through NPBT. Liability is particularly
likely to become an important issue for plant breeders active in the United
States. Under the Lanham Act, companies can be held liable if their policies
threaten export opportunities for US products. In the past, this occurred in
the case of corn, where Syngenta had received approval for the cultivation of
GM corn in theUS, which had not yet obtained approval for import into China
(Redick 2019). Although China ultimately did approve the GM corn, it was at
a substantial delay. In the meantime, it rejected corn imports from the US, as
a zero-tolerance level could not be ensured. Syngenta was sued by farmers and
corn traders, and it was forced to pay several millions of dollars in compensa-
tion. Similar situations are likely to occur with the approval of NPBT-derived
GMOs that are destined for the European market. The decision of the CJEU
could thus have important international spill-over effects, resulting in what is
known as the “Brussels effect” (Bradford 2012; Sinopoli and Purnhagen 2016).
Although the Americas might be reluctant to adopt NPBTs for crop
production, other regions might be less concerned. China is a world leader
with regard to investments in such technology (Martin-Laffon, Kuntz, and Ri-
croch 2019), and it is much less dependent on agriculture and food exports to
the EU. China is able to use the technology widely, in addition to disseminat-
ing its technology to neighboring countries, which are more tightly connected
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to China than they are to the EU. Examples include African countries, whose
Chinese foreign strategies in the past decade have increased their collaboration
with China (Brautigam 2015). In the end, Africa may not be as disadvantaged
as many fear, as China could potentially fill the technology gap (Castell 2019).
D Implications for the Environment
The absolute interpretation of the precautionary principle (see above), as ex-
ercised by the CJEU in the case of GMO regulations, is questionable. It blurs
the line between the precautionary principle and the principle that preventive
action should be taken. Adverse effects can never be excluded with certainty
(Bobek 2018, Van den Belt 2003). Moreover, an absolute application of the
precautionary principle could be counter-productive, as it could delay or even
prevent the use of new technologies that can reduce harm to human health
and the environment. Herbicide-resistant crops (e.g., in combination with
glyphosate) result in the release of less-toxic active ingredients (AI) into the en-
vironment by substituting them for more-toxic herbicides. They also support
the adoption of reduced and zero-tillage systems, and they have the potential
to reduce the overall use of herbicides in crop rotations (Wesseler, Scatasta,
and Fall 2011). Almost all of herbicide resistant crops would be banned for cul-
tivation in the EU. Other applications of directed mutagenesis for agricultural
crops include increasing the shelf-life of food products (e.g., non-browning
mushrooms and apples), thereby reducing food waste. Researchers are work-
ing to develop a variety of crop improvements, including wheat that is resistant
to powdery mildew (thereby reducing fungicide use) and insect-resistant corn.
More examples are listed in Table 1. Empirical evidence concerning the culti-
vation of GMOs indicates that they have made substantial contributions to re-
ducing the use of insecticides, to promoting the shift tomore environmentally-
friendly herbicides, and to decreasing the emission of greenhouse gases (e.g.,
Brookes and Barfoot 2020; Brookes, Taheripour, and Tyner 2017; Smyth et al.
2011a,b). For example, Wesseler et al. (2017) provide a detailed discussion of
four transgenic crops that provide nutritional benefits for malnourished chil-
dren in Africa, while Qaim (2020) discusses the wider implications for food se-
curity and sustainable agriculture. These developments will also make it more
difficult (i.e., more expensive) for the EU to achieve the objectives of the EU
Green Deal, which include zero net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050,
with no person and no place left behind (EC 2019).
IV A Way Out ?
Thus far, the discussion has highlighted several real and potential implications
of the CJEU decision, which initiated a debate about possibilities for changing
the current situation. Initiatives have been instigated in order to adjust EU
legislation and policy concerning GMOs (Eriksson et al 2020a, Eriksson et al
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2020b; Eriksson et al 2020c). The EUCouncil has requested the EC to conduct
a study on the legal status of “novel genomic techniques” and, depending on the
results of the study, to develop a proposal for change (Council of the European
Union 2019).
One crucial difficulty in changing the current situation has to do with
the qualifiedmajority ofMember States needed in order to adopt such changes.
If a proposal is submitted by the EC, it requires a qualified majority of 55% of
the EUMember States to vote in favor (16 out of 28 before Brexit, and currently
15 out of 27), representing at least 65% of the total EU population (about 334
million before Brexit, and currently 290 million). If these conditions are not
met, the requirements for a qualifiedmajority increase. Furthermore, nomore
than three countries may vote against the proposal (see Box 1).
As evidenced by the voting behavior of Member States with regard to
the approval of GMOs for import and processing since 2001, a qualified ma-
jority for or against approval has never been reached. In an analysis of voting
behavior concerning approval between 2001 and 2014, Smart, Blum, and Wes-
seler (2015) identify patterns in which someMember States voted for and some
voted against, while others switched. Since 2015, the pendulum has swung in
the direction of the “against” faction. The voting behavior of 2019 clearly re-
flects an increase in the number of countries voting “against” or abstaining
(Figure 1). The situation is likely to become even more difficult in the wake of
Brexit, as the UK has always been a strong supporter of transgenic crops, in
addition to having a relatively large population.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the voting behavior of the Standing
Committee and the Appeal Committee since 2013. The maximum number of
Member States voting in favor of a proposal was 14 in 2014. In 2019, the high-
est number in favor was 12. The greatest share of the population was slightly
more than 46%—almost 20% shy of reaching the qualifiedmajority-population
threshold. If a qualified majority in favor of a change to Directive 2001/18 can-
not be reached in either the Standing Committee or the Appeal Committee,
the EC decides.
The legislative procedure for changing Directive 2001/18 or any other
EU legislative act concerning GMOs also requires a qualified majority among
the representatives of the Member States in the Council. Not being able to
reach consensus on the approval of a GMO in the comitology procedure is
hence a strong indication that any proposed change to Directive 2001/18 is
likewise unlikely to receive a positive qualified majority, even ignoring the dif-
ficulty of reaching agreement on the type of changes that would be required in
the first place. As experience shows, the more supportive the legislative pro-
posal is toward reducing regulatory hurdles for the approval for NPBTs (i.e.,
by reducing the costs of approval), the stronger the opposition is likely to be.
While “lighter” proposals, which involve only marginal reductions in approval
costs, might not receive strong opposition, they might not resolve the poten-
tially negative implications for R&D and international trade. Independent of
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the details of proposed changes, changes to Directive 2001/18 can be expected
to take many years, as such proposals would need to be developed by the EC
voted on by the representatives of the Member States in Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament.
The procedures, hence, for changing the Directive concerning the
release of GMOs into the environment question the feasibility of propos-
als calling for an extension of the mutagenesis exemption to include ad-
ditional technologies (e.g., CRISPR-Cas TALEN or OMG), as proposed by
such institutions as the Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina,
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft und Union der deutschen Akademien der
Wissenschaften (2019). Such proposals are unlikely to be implemented soon,
if at all.
Another possibility for challenging the decision by the CJEU and call-
ing for action by the EC could be through a “citizens’ initiative.” One such
initiative has been initiated (https://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/in
itiatives/open/details/2019/000012) and, if supported, it would call on the EC
to respond and act. This might be an alternative way to seek action if the EC
concludes (as a result of Council Decision 2019/1904) that no further action is
needed. In this case as well, however, any changes would require a qualified
majority in the Council and a supporting vote by the European Parliament.
At this point, there does not seem to be any quickway out of the current
deadlock.
As proposed by Purnhagen (2019), another alternative could involve fil-
ing another court case in aMember State different than France. In this case the
local court expresses an opinion different from the one issued by the French
court based on French law, and approves cultivation of a crop developed by
using a NPBT. Such a case could potentially be transferred to the CJEU, which
would once again need to decide. In such a case, however, it would be possi-
ble to submit facts other than those presented to the court in the French case,
possibly resulting in a different outcome.
An alternative route could also be to initiate another case triggering a
different procedure from the one initiated by the Conseil d’État. A member
state such as the Netherlands or Sweden allows farmers to grow herbicide re-
sistant oilseed rape developed by NPBTs, the same herbicide resistant oilseed
rape triggering the court case in France. The Member State would not imple-
ment EU law and the EC initiate a legal procedure, similar to the case initiated
by the EC against Germany in the case nitrate emissions (EC 2017). In such
procedures the role of the CJEU is a different one. It would not be tied to
help local courts deciding their case according to the questions referred, but is
rather tied to solve the case brought before it including own fact finding. This
may result in a different outcome.
Each of the solutions would also require the representatives presenting
the facts to be extremely well prepared. Depending on the outcome of such a
case, it may, however, well be that the representatives of the ECwould still need
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to demonstrate a willingness to adopt a change. The ultimate success of such
an effort could be questioned, given that EC representatives have applauded
the current judgment as a great decision providing clarity.
Further, as long as the CJEU maintains its interpretation of GMO leg-
islation, and particularly its absolute interpretation of the precautionary prin-
ciple, future court cases aimed at changing the implications of the current case
should stress both the relative safety ofNPBTs (asmentioned in theOpinion by
the General Advocate) and the potential risks to the environment and human
health associated with restricting access to NPBTs.
V Conclu s i on s
In this contribution, we assess and discuss the implications of the decision
reached by the CJEU on July 2018. Our assessment is arguably speculative, as
we are not able to provide any quantitative calculation of the effects of this de-
cision. It is nevertheless based on legal facts, and the economic implications
derived from the assessment are based on economic theory.
TheCJEUdecision of July 2018 has far-reaching economic implications,
given that products derived through the application of NPBTs are currently
regarded as GMOs, such that they are not covered by the mutagenesis exemp-
tion. This reduces the possibilities available to EU farmers to take advantage
of NPBTs, thereby reducing their comparative advantage. As a consequence,
it will be more costly to achieve the objectives of the European Green Deal.
The decision increases the costs of plant breeding both within and be-
yond the EU. The “Brussels effect” may result in substantially fewer applica-
tions of NPBTs—not only from within the EU, but also from countries that
export to the EU. This is particularly likely to affect the United States, as plant-
breeding companies that release crops in the US that are regarded as GMOs in
the EU could potentially be held liable under the Lanham Act. Even if this is
not the case, any crops derived from NPBTs would need approval for import
and processing in the EU, thereby increasing costs.
Many scientists and other stakeholder groups have requested a revision
of the EU policies on GMOs. The EU Council of Ministers has recently started
exploring the possibilities for a change. In addition, there is a legal possibility
for clarifying the legal uncertainty resulting from theCJEUdecision. Neverthe-
less, any change in policy—if possible at all—would take several years, given
the highly controversial nature of the topic. As new developments continue to
emerge in the area in plant breeding and biotechnology in general, the EU and
its major trading partners will be affected. This offers opportunities for coun-
tries like China and those supported by China, which do not depend on ex-
ports to the EU. These countries are able to adopt NPBTs and enjoy a relatively
higher rate of growth in their agricultural sectors, in addition to possessing the
knowledge of new technologies, as well as improvements in human health and
environmental protection.
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VI I Append i x
Table 1 Applications and Potential Applications of NPBTs in Agriculture (Ex-
amples).
Plant Trait
Improved food and feed quality
Alfalfa Reduced lignin content1
Camelina Improved fatty acid composition1
Lettuce Increased vitamin C content1
Potato Reduced arcylamide formation1
Oilseed rape Improved fatty acid composition2
Soybean Improved fatty acid composition1
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Plant Trait









Source: Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina,
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft und Union der deutschen Akademien der
Wissenschaften (2019) note by superscript (1) along with a few additional
examples: 2) European GMO Initiative for a Unified Database System (2019);
3) APHIS (2019); 4) Schaart et al. (2016).
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Table 2 Labeling Requirements for GMOs in the European Union
GM product Example Labeling
requirement















GM feed Corn Yes




Feed additive produced from a GMO Vitamin B2 Yes
Food from animals fed on GM feed Eggs, meat,
milk
No
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Figure 1 Voting Behavior by EU Member States with regard to the Ap-
proval of GMOs, 2013 to 2019.
Source: Authors, based on reports by Agrafacts, several years. Note:
Panel A shows the number of Member States that have voted in favor of ap-
proval, and Panel B shows the percentage of EU population reached by Mem-
ber States voting in favor. Votes include decisions in the Standing Committee
and the Appeal Committee. The results are presented in chronological order
from 2013 to 2019.
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Box 1 Qualified Majority Voting in the EU
A qualified majority requires two threshold levels:
1. 55% of Member States must vote in favor: prior to Brexit, this trans-
lated to 16 out of 28, and it currently means 15 out of 27.
2. The proposal must be supported by members representing at least
65% of the total EU population.
Blocking minority: at least four Council members representing more
than 35% of the EU population. This has been implemented to avoid a situation
in which three large countries (e.g., France, Germany, and Italy) could block a
decision.
Special cases
When not all Member States participate in the vote (e.g., due to an opt-
out in certain policy areas):
1. 55% of the participating Council members must vote in favor.
2. The proposal must be supported by members representing at least
65% of the total EU population.
For proposals not coming from the Commission or the High Represen-
tative:
1. 72% of all Council members (currently 21 Council members) must
vote in favor.
2. The proposal must be supported by members representing at least
65% of the total EU population.
Abstentions
An abstention under qualified majority voting counts as a vote against
the proposal. Abstention is not the same as not participating in the vote. Any
member can abstain at any time.
Source: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-syste
m/qualified-majority/
